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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION RESPONSE

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The National Guard Role in Weapons of Mass Destruction Response

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The threat to the United States society by an attack involving a weapon of mass destruction is a well-founded and often addressed concern for our national security. This Strategy Research Project defines the background for this national concern and presents a summary of our current national security documents and strategies for responding to such a threat. Responsibility for WMD defense rests in a number of federal and state agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Defense, in its role of military support to civil authorities. The newly appointed first response mechanism for the Department of Defense is the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (formerly called Military Support Detachment-Rapid Assessment Initial Detection team; MSD-RAID). This SRP further discusses the roles and responsibilities of the WMD-Civil Support Team concept, and analyzes its utility in light of current threat and capabilities. There are a number of current challenges and concerns to the use of the National Guard in such a role, and this SRP discusses the most important ones, and summarizes the issue in terms of application to current campaign planning criteria for joint operations; that is, adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with doctrine.

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THE NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION RESPONSE

The United States now faces something of a superpower paradox. Our supremacy in the conventional arena is prompting adversaries to seek unconventional, asymmetric means to strike our Achilles' heel. At least 25 countries now have -- or are in the process of acquiring and developing -- weapons of mass destruction...The race is on between our preparations and those of our adversaries. We are preparing for the possibility of a chemical or biological attack on American soil because we must. There is not a moment to lose. \(^1\)

This statement by United States Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in a July 1999 Washington Post article is the most recent articulation of U.S. policy concerning terrorism preparation and defense, and consequences regarding so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.S. position concerning terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is well developed and reflected in all principal national security strategy documents.

The Clinton administration's 1998 National Security Strategy sounds the alert in the introductory pages "Protecting our citizens and critical infrastructures at home is an essential element of our strategy. Potential adversaries — whether nations, terrorist groups or criminal organizations — will be tempted to ... use weapons of mass destruction against civilians." The National Security Strategy further identifies terrorism as a global concern, and lists terrorism and the spread of dangerous technologies; WMD, as two of the five major threats to U.S. interests. It further outlines the president's policy for managing the consequences of a WMD incident, and details federal responsibility for such management.³

The 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review continues the identification of this threat by stating "Of particular concern is the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery." And further, its relevance is that "other unconventional means of attack, such as terrorism, are no longer just threats to our diplomats, military forces, and private Americans overseas, but will threaten Americans at home in the years to come." 5

General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his opening remarks for the National Military Strategy of 1997 defines the threat through its unconventional manner. "While we no longer face the threat of a rival superpower, there are states and other actors who can challenge us and our allies conventionally and by asymmetric means such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." The concept of strategic ends, ways, and means is introduced in the National Military Strategy as a method for meeting the shape, respond, and prepare model set forth in the previous documents. These national security documents introduce several concepts. They all stress the severity of the threat posed to America by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They in part suggest or define methods of countering the problem, and they prioritize the necessity of preparedness and response. Complete understanding of these concepts is especially important to the commanders; the CINCs, of region and function, so that they will be well prepared to support the National Command Authorities. But just what is the nature of this problem of weapons of mass destruction? Where is this terrorist threat? What events

have brought our key National leaders to address this issue so repeatedly and consistently? What is the current, consistent, defined United States policy concerning terrorism and weapons of mass destruction? What are the objectives, concepts, and resources being articulated in our fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction? Who has planning and management responsibility on these issues? What are the challenges and unresolved issues that force Secretary Cohen to comment that we haven't a moment to lose? And finally, what role will the National Guard assume in preparing our nation to deter and survive a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction?

DEFINITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS

For the purpose of this research paper, discussion must be limited to certain specifics of the topic, and a clear understanding of concepts and definitions is needed. The United States policy to counter acts of international terrorism (as articulated in the National Security Strategy) includes four principles. They are; we will make no concessions to terrorists. We will bring pressure to bear on state sponsors of terrorism. We will use legal mechanisms to deal with known terrorists. We will help other governments to combat terrorism.⁷ Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, issued by president Clinton in June of 1995, further delineates our policy to deter, defeat, or respond to a terrorist attack. We will reduce our vulnerabilities to terrorism, deter terrorism through a clear public position, respond rapidly and decisively to terrorism wherever it occurs, and develop capabilities to manage consequences of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) materials used by terrorists.⁸ For the purpose of this paper, consideration will be limited to our ability to deter or respond to terrorist attacks on the U.S. society or population only, and the consequence management of such an act if committed. Therefore, not all of the U.S. policy for countering terrorism is applicable.

Additionally, this paper will not discuss crisis management or offensive actions in a counter-terrorist mode outside of the United States. Those actions fall within the environment of Special Operations Command or as an offensive military operation and are outside of the scope of this paper. Further, discussion will be limited to terrorist threats against the general population of the U.S., and will not focus on traditional military nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities, force protection roles such as rear area defense, power projection or debarkation points, or small scale contingencies or other asymmetric military threats.

Weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of this paper will be limited to discussion of chemical or biological agents, and will not look at nuclear weapons used as a terrorist tool, nor will this paper discuss non-proliferation issues germane to nuclear weapon systems.

BACKGROUND

Public consciousness in the United States concerning weapons of mass destruction and their use by terrorists has been slow to develop. We have a natural tendency toward isolationism in America, and our geography has allowed us to remain buffered by the two great oceans that protect our shores. All of that complacency began to change during the 1990's due to world events and several terrorist attacks in

the United States. Although not directly related, the terrorist attacks in Tokyo, New York City, and Oklahoma City rang an alarm bell in the public and our national leadership.

NEW YORK WORLD TRADE CENTER

The first of these new breeds of terrorist attacks occurred at the World Trade Center twin towers in New York City on March 5, 1993. A massive truck bomb exploded in the parking garage of the twin towers that ripped a crater three floors deep which immediately killed seven people and injured 1,000. The blast collapsed the nearby PATH train station, and trapped more than 50,000 people in the towers, whose 110 floors filled with smoke within minutes. The bomb was aimed at the heart of the city's financial district, and was placed to achieve maximum effect, both in immediate structural collapse and in fire, smoke, and panic damage. This was the first terrorist attack of this magnitude on American soil, and the impact on America was significant. No longer would we believe that we were immune from this type of horrifying threat, and there was reason to question our capability to defend against or respond to an event of this magnitude.

TOKYO SUBWAY

The March 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system was the first truly alarming new action by a terrorist group using a weapon of mass destruction. Here, a new threat had become reality. A chemical agent had been released in a major world metropolitan area with the distinct intention of causing catastrophic civilian casualties. The Tokyo chemical attack blamed on the fanatic Aum Shinrikyo apocalyptic religious sect killed 10 citizens while injuring more than 5,500. Sarin gas had been released from packages in at least three subway trains that were all to converge at the subway station in central Tokyo located as the hub for top government offices. One senior official called the subway poisoning "a declaration of war against the Japanese government". Just as importantly, the attack caused severe damage to the city, and the nation's, sense of security; "While it is hard to build a safe society, it is very easy to destroy it."

OKLAHOMA CITY

The final event which strengthened American resolve to battle terrorism at home was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on April 19th, 1995. The nation's worst terrorist event left 168 dead and many more lives shattered, and the nation's psyche would never be the same again. This time, however, an American had orchestrated the attack that originated within America. This truck bomb, and these terrorist outcasts, would drive the nation to a war-like state. ¹³

Since then, incidents of equal alarm have abounded. Massive car bombs hit the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on the same day in August of 1998, killing over 140 and injuring more than 1,600. Bombs exploded in Atlanta, GA, Yuba City, CA, and Spokane, WA, which were directly linked to U.S. extremist groups. These incidents of the 1990's moved the country to a hard

line position of military response and the use of America's military strengths to hit terrorist targets abroad. It was now war on terrorists. The Oklahoma City bombing had further given the current administration the political mandate and will to take a hard line. Within months Congress passed anti-terrorism bills and the president issued several directives guiding strategy, and creating new counter-terrorism positions.

CURRENT POLICY

Following the highly publicized 1993 bombing of the New York World trade Center and the 1995 federal building disaster in Oklahoma City, President William Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (June 1995), which is a culmination of current United States national policy on terrorism. That document builds logically on policy outlined in each of the U.S. major strategy documents: the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Military Strategy, and others.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Under the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 the President of the United States is required to transmit to Congress an annual report concerning the status of the nation's security. This document, commonly referred to as the National Security Strategy (NSS), includes summaries of American national interests, capabilities, and strategies for defense. ¹⁵ President Clinton's 1998 National Security Strategy immediately addressed the threat of terrorism "This strategy encompasses a wide range of initiatives…multinational coalitions combating terrorism". ¹⁶ The severity of this problem is further enhanced on the following pages; "Protecting our citizens and critical infrastructures at home is an essential element of our strategy. Potential adversaries…will be tempted to …use weapons of mass destruction against civilians."

Within the NSS section entitled "Advancing U.S. National Interests" are listed five major threats to U.S. interests. Two of the five threats address terrorism ("Transnational Threats") and weapons of mass destruction ("Spread of Dangerous Technologies"). ¹⁸ The NSS spells out a policy which requires American leaders to shape the international environment, respond to threats and crisis, and prepare now for an uncertain future. ¹⁹ Our primary initiative for shaping the environment is through the use of nonproliferation initiatives and treaties, and conventions concerning chemical and biological weapons. In order to respond to terrorist threats we have a policy based on four principals: "(1) make no concessions to terrorists; (2) bring all pressure to bear on all state sponsors of terrorism; (3) fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists; and (4) help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism." ²⁰ This policy is directed specifically against the transnational threat poised by international terrorists.

However, a new threat emerges at home in America due to our international military superiority.

Access to dangerous technologies and the vulnerability of America's borders could lead an adversary to strike American citizens or our critical infrastructure. President Clinton's National Security Strategy, and

Presidential Decision Directive 62 (issued May 1998), outlines our plan for managing the consequences of a WMD event.

The Federal government will respond rapidly and decisively to any terrorist incident in the United States, working with state and local governments to restore order and deliver emergency assistance. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, has the overall lead in operational response to a WMD incident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports the FBI in preparing and responding to the consequences of a WMD incident. ²¹

This section of the NSS further directs the development of Department of Defense support forces for WMD incidents. Specifically, the Army National Guard is tasked with the role to create and train special units to assist local and state authorities in the management of consequences of a WMD event.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The Quadrennial Defense review (QDR) is the Secretary of Defense's report to Congress and the President. It is a comprehensive review of the nation's military, and, like the NSS, it examines national security threats and strategy. It is the Defense Department blueprint for implementing the Presidents vision for national defense. This QDR focuses on strategy, force structure, vision, and fiscal concerns for developing a military force with all capabilities for the future. One highlight of the QDR was "the danger to our nation and forces of asymmetric threats, ranging from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to attacks via information warfare and terrorism. We will give increased focus and funding to countering such threats." The Quadrennial Defense Review notes the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their components and underscores the threat these weapons will have on the U.S. society.

The Department of Defense recognizes its need to change in order to respond to asymmetric challenges in the future. Chief among the response actions needed is NBC detection and survivability, counterproliferation efforts, counterterrorism training and technologies, force protection, antiterrorism capabilities, consequence management, and vulnerability assessment.²³ The department aims to "make U.S. forces as preeminent in combating terrorism as they are in other forces of warfare."²⁴

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The 1997 National Military Strategy is also based on the principals of shape, respond, and prepare, and provides the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the American military of how to go about meeting the goals of the President and the Secretary of Defense. This document, of course, also addresses the asymmetric threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, but further sets forth the strategic objectives, concepts, and resources needed in this fight. "U.S. forces will act unilaterally and in concert with security partners, using all means authorized by the President and the Congress, to counter terrorism at home and abroad." It aims to do this by a program of countering weapons of mass destruction. U.S. forces must prevent the spread of WMD, detect an adversary's intention to use WMD, destroy, deter, or counter WMD, protect the force from WMD, and restore areas affected by the use of WMD.

These documents not only specify our national objectives in regard to weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, but also further define how and with what means the nation shall battle these enemies.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVES

All of these national security documents reflect a public alert which articulates current U.S. policy dating back to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39. Following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, President Clinton issued PDD 39 (June 1995) which outlined United States national policy on terrorism. This PDD stated that "It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace, or on foreign territory."²⁷ It is the U.S. policy to work with friendly governments in combating terrorism, to identify and pursue sponsors of terrorism, to make no concessions to terrorists, and to prepare to combat terrorism through the following steps. Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to terrorism, deter terrorism through clear public policies, respond to terrorism directed against us, ²⁸ and to "give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists."²⁹

PDD 39 set forth the exact policy, which would be echoed in the major national security documents to follow. PDD 62, issued in May of 1998, expanded the vision set forth in PDD 39. It continued the theme of combating terrorism through cooperation with allies, strengthening laws, and improving security, but also focused emphasis on managing consequences of a weapon of mass destruction event. PDD 62 created the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism. Acting through the National Security Council, the national coordinator will oversee all policies and programs dealing with terrorism protection and management, and will report to the President through the National Security Advisor. Presidential Decision Directive 63, also May of 1998, mandated the protection of critical infrastructure. It focused the protection of all interconnected infrastructure, and set up new structure, policy, National Coordinator and analysis center within the FBI. 31

RESPONSIBILITIES

This series of timely Presidential directives and National Security documents made clear the challenges of protecting American society from terrorist attack. The Office of the Chief Executive, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; all demand processes and programs for combating the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Responsibility for responding to a terrorist act in the United States rests on the federal government, working with and supporting state and local governments. Inherent in any Federal program is the recognition of civil liberty concerns prohibiting the conduct of military operations in America. The Federal role is strictly and always a support role.

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN

Initial responsibility for responding to a disaster or emergency, whether man made (civil disturbances, strikes, riots) or natural (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, fires) falls first on local authorities; the town, city, township, or county fire, police, EMT, or HAZMAT teams. When available assistance is exhausted, the State is asked to apply resources, including the National Guard used in their Title 32 non-Federal status. If the massive effects of an emergency overwhelm a State, the Governor may ask the President of the U.S. for a disaster declaration, and Federal resources can then be applied, up to and including Department of Defense assets. Authority for the application of Federal government assets is contained in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act. Management of this application of Federal assets is conducted according to the Federal Response Plan (FRP), for Public Law 93-288, as amended. The purpose of the Federal Response Plan "is to facilitate the delivery of all types of Federal response assistance to States to help them deal with the consequences of significant disasters." This Plan is the base document for Federal assistance to a state or local government effected by a disaster.

FEMA

Direct responsibility for providing assistance to an affected State will be carried out by the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), acting on behalf of the President. The director of FEMA will appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) as his representative to deliver federal assistance. The FCO will head the Emergency Response Team. All assistance will go directly from Federal agencies to the State under the direction of the FCO, working with an appointed State Coordinating Officer. The Federal Response Plan groups Federal assistance into functional areas, known as Emergency Support Functions. Each functional area is headed by a primary Federal agency, with additional support provided by a mix of other agencies.

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

The twelve Functional annexes of the Federal Response Plan and their primary agencies are as follows:

Transportation

Department of Transportation

Communications

National Communications System

Public Works & Engineering

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Fire Fighting

U.S. Forest Service

Information & Planning

FEMA

Mass Care

American Red Cross

Resource Support

General Service Administration

Health & Medical Service

Public Health Service

Urban Search & Rescue

FEMA

Hazardous Material

Environmental Protection Agency

Food

Department of Agriculture

Energy

Department of Energy³³

Of note is that in all twelve functional areas the Department of Defense is given an additional emergency support role. In instances of disaster or emergency that effect the national security of the United States, appropriate Federal military authorities and procedures will be used. The Department of Defense will provide a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to work in the field and be the point of contact to the FCO regarding needs for military assistance.³⁴

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The role of the Department of Defense in supporting civilian authorities is carefully defined and directed by law and policy. The existing structure utilizing the Federal Response Plan and the DCO was established in order to provide military assistance in disaster situations. All military assistance of this type provided to civilian authorities was to be conducted in accordance with procedures set forth in the Department of Defense directive number 3025.15 entitled "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities." DOD 3025.15 outlined criteria for employment of military forces. 35

Also specifically spelled out was authority and responsibility for support to civil authorities. The Secretary of the Army had approval authority for all military assistance of an emergency manner. The Secretary of Defense was the approval authority for any actions involving assignment of Combatant Command forces. A central figure in the entire process once Federal military forces were involved was the Director of Military Support (DOMS). This General officer was permanently appointed to coordinate all Departments and agencies with the commander.

NUNN, LUGER, DOMENICI

Significant additional emphasis for Federal response in a terrorist scenario was mandated in 1997 with the passage of the so-called Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, sponsored by Senators Nunn, Luger, and Domenici.³⁶ The act mandated preparedness and provided significant funding to develop methods for responding to a terrorist act using a weapon of mass destruction. "The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Section 1414 of Public Law 104-201, and the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act requires DoD to develop and maintain a domestic terrorism rapid response team capable of aiding federal, state, and local officials." There were to be three integral parts of the Federal response to a WMD incident. Once the decision has been made, a Response Task Force would be activated in either the Eastern or Western half of the United States. This RTF would work through the Director of Military Support and the Defense Coordinating Officer to bring Federal assets to bear. Technical expertise concerning WMD will be provided by the Chemical/ Biological Rapid Response Team (CB-RRT), whose mission is to "deploy, in support of the lead federal agency, and assist in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of WMD articles...and assist first responders in dealing with potential WMD consequences." The final part of the Federal response

equation would be the new Army National Guard Rapid Assessment – Initial Detection (RAID) teams (the name was later changed to WMD Civil Support Teams) established in the ten FEMA regions.

JOINT FORCES COMMAND

One final modification to the Federal response was the designation in 1999 of US Atlantic Command as the Joint Forces Command. This change assigned important considerable emphasis to military support to civil authorities. The new Joint Forces Command has responsibility for training and warfighting in joint operations and assigned a joint task force for computer defense to U.S. Space Command. The biggest change, and one often debated, is the assigning of the concept of civil support to Joint Forces Command; One of the new missions of the Joint Forces Command is to provide military assistance to civil authorities in the event of an attack or accident involving weapons of mass destruction. A Joint Task Force for Civil Support commanded by a two-star general officer will carry out the mission. The Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-C/S) will work through the Director of Military Support to assist in providing Federal forces and support to local responders for consequence management in the event of a WMD incident. Joint Forces Command will also retain the full resources of Forces Command (FORSCOM) to provide military support to civil authorities. The FORSCOM mission is in place and includes control of the nation's reserve component forces – the Army Reserves and the National Guard, to accomplish its missions.

NATIONAL GUARD

The National Guard is a historic, professional, community based military organization trained and evaluated to the same exacting standards as the active duty forces. The Army National Guard is located in over 3000 armories and bases in all 50 states while the Air National Guard consists of 89 units in over 170 installations. The Army Guard's over 350,000 soldiers form more than one half of the Army's ground combat forces and over one third of the support forces. The National Guard is dual missioned, having a constitutional basis as both a militia for state purposes, and as a part of the Federal military reserve component forces under Department of Defense. The Guard remains, according to the constitution, a state administered force, that when used in a state role is a support to civil authorities. The Guard state mission is to "provide units trained and equipped to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety, under the order of State and Federal authorities."

GUARD COMMAND

The National Guard Bureau is an authorized agency with a clear relationship between the National Command Authorities, the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and the individual States. At the State level command, the governor of the State is authorized to appoint an Adjutant General from among the ranks of the National Guard to serve as a Major General equivalent and carry out military duties as directed by the Governor. The Governor authorizes the National Guard to carry out missions of

military support to civil authorities by State executive order – in a non-federal (Title 32) role. States may provide additional assistance to other States under interstate compacts, to assist in emergency and disaster relief. Many States have formed regional compacts for the sharing of resources. It should be noted that National Guard training does not encompass military support to civil authorities missions, since these are not war fighting skills.

FEDERAL ROLE

When it becomes necessary to utilize the National Guard in a Federal role, coordination is effected between Federal and State authorities. To utilize the Guard, the State Area Command (STARC) and the National Guard Bureau remain in coordination through the Director of Military Support (DOMS) to the FBI, the FEMA, or the other organizations described as per the Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Functions. "If the President determines it is necessary to augment the active forces...he may authorize a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) under 10 USC 12304 to order units of the National Guard and the Federal reserves to active duty. If the President declares a national emergency, units of the National Guard and reserves may be ordered to active duty pursuant to partial mobilization under 10 USC 12302. The likely use of National Guard forces for a WMD incident will be under a Presidential Reserve Call-up of 10 USC 12304. This authority is constitutionally provided and provides "an immediate federal military response in the local community."

WMD CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM

The newest, and certainly one of the most visible and powerful tools the National guard has in combating terrorism on American Soil is the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team. Originally called RAID teams, they are the designated first DoD military response to a suspected WMD event. They were specifically designed and tailored to respond in support of the incident commander to an attack by a terrorist using a weapon of mass destruction. The original Nunn, Lugar, Domenici legislation was in the form of a provision to the Defense Authorization Act of FY 97. It called for the President and Department of Defense to study the capabilities of the nations military to respond to a WMD incident. Said Senator Nunn; "We are not prepared as a nation to deal with a chemical or biological attack. We have a long way to go in the overall area of getting our policemen, our firemen and our health officials able to handle one of these threats." ⁴⁶ The Congressional action called for some sort of rapid response capability within the military to assist local responders with an assessment, a determination, and a recommendation.

The Department of Defense passed the projected mission to the National Guard, and logically so. "Because domestic WMD attacks historically have been a wartime concern, the Guard's readiness as a combat force, coupled with its experience supporting federal, state and local agencies in times of hometown disasters makes the Guard the obvious choice to respond to a WMD attack." The Department of Defense sought a military unit "capable of aiding federal, state and local officials in the

detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement and disposal of weapons of mass destruction." In 1998 DoD released its recommendation for the forming of the RAID team concept within the National Guard.

The original National Guard study called for the formation of 54 Rapid Assessment Initial Detection teams in all states and U.S. territories. Teams were to be trained and equipped to be compatible to civilian first responders. The 1999 defense budget authorized, in fact, ten RAID teams to be located in each of the ten FEMA regions; each team to be made up of 22 full time Guardsmen to States were chosen to field a RAID (or WMD Civil Support) Team within each FEMA region based on criteria of; population of the state, threat assessment and high value targets, National Guard airlift capability, key resources for WMD response, and interstate compacts and state support. The ten states in order by FEMA region are Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois, Texas, Missouri, Colorado, California, and Washington. FEMA region 3, the Pennsylvania WMD Civil Support Team area, also includes the District of Columbia, National Capitol Region and involves obvious special concerns.

The composition of the WMD Civil Support Teams remained essentially unchanged during the proposal and approval process. The teams are composed of six elements; command and control team (two soldiers), operations team (four soldiers), communications team (two soldiers), medical team (four soldiers), administration/logistics team (two soldiers), and two survey teams (eight soldiers). The total team of 22 includes seven officers and 14 enlisted soldier job specialties. The mission of the WMD Civil Support Team is to:

Deploy to an incident site in support of the local incident commander to:

ASSESS a suspected nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological event.

ADVISE civilian responders regarding appropriate actions.

FACILITATE requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of additional state or federal assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. 54

Training and equipping the WMD Civil Support Teams is an extensive process that is ongoing. Effective and realistic individual and unit training coupled with performance based exercises is the challenge of WMD Civil Support Team training. Existing civilian and military training will be utilized and integrated. Regional exercises and simulations will accomplish practice and validation. Both should involve all response components, civilian and military. The WMD Civil Support Team thus must be trained for individual team deployment, and then must assume a trainer role, working to improve the skills of civilian responders and other National Guard soldiers. WMD Civil Support Team equipment requirements are considerable, and offer stringent interoperability. Equipment ranges from team specific vehicles, supplies, communications, computers, medical and chemical, test material, safety and protective, detection and sampling, photo and video, and training equipment to specific equipment for the decontamination, limited recon, and medical elements. Sec. 256

The ten initial WMD Civil Support Teams are functional and on track to be operationally available in January 2000. Most are over 95% personnel fill and the only major equipment shortage at this time is the

Mobile Analytical Lab (MAL) vehicle. Also being brought on board during FY 00 will be 44 so called WMD Civil Support Teams, light, a limited chem-bio response capability drawn from available force structure. These light teams are composed of the same positions as the other teams, but are made up of part-time Guardsmen in states not now funded for a WMD Civil Support Team. Both the U.S. House of representatives and the U.S. Senate have authorized an additional 17 WMD Civil Support Teams to be placed in states most in need. ⁵⁷

The most current concept for deployment of the WMD Civil Support Teams is found in the Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (C-BRRT) CONOPS (Concept of Operations). Once deployed in support of a local incident commander, the team will assess the suspected event, advise the civilians regarding further actions, and use their reach back capability to request additional state and federal assets. The WMD Civil Support Teams, while in a civilian advisory role, are under the control of the State Adjutant General, with a capability to be federalized and perform assigned federal missions. Each state has laws and regulations regarding the deployment of soldiers in a state active duty status. The respective state's Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officer (POMSO) working in cooperation with C-BRRT accomplish coordination for the team.

CHALLENGES

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Soon after the first Department of Defense study concerning use of the Reserve component force in prevention of WMD incidents was released, the General Accounting Office was asked by Congress to analyze the viability of this concept. The GAO obtained the views of state and local officials regarding the role of RAID/WMD Civil Support Teams, they determined whether other government agencies were capable of performing the roles anticipated for WMD Civil Support Teams, and they evaluated how the WMD Civil Support Teams were to meet their anticipated responsibilities. This first critical analysis addressed most of the ongoing concerns regarding the role of the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams in WMD prevention.

Initially, the GAO report questions the validity of an actual WMD threat. According to intelligence agencies "conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives, at least partly because these materials are more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable." The GAO further concludes that although unlikely, the results of such an event would be disastrous. This qualification seems to fly in the face of all Federal policy establishing a response to WMD as an extremely high priority, and is not valid in current Department of Defense planning.

More serious perhaps, were the GAO findings in four specific areas. The report suggested that there were significant management and coordination challenges imbedded in the RAID/WMD Civil Support Team concept, and there were evident duplication and gaps. The report suggested that the Department of Defense had not clearly articulated the role of the WMD Civil Support Teams. The report

suggested that the FBI and FEMA were uncomfortable with the role of the WMD Civil Support Teams in implementation, in so far as the National Guard already had a more traditional role in civil support. The report suggested that many States had concerns about the validity, use, and availability of the WMD civil support teams.

The challenge of management and coordination concerning the WMD Civil Support Teams, and the prospect of duplication of effort, or of gaps and shortfalls in effort, are serious and immediate. Department of Defense Joint Pub 5-0, <u>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</u> contains very usable operation plan review criteria. This criteria assesses a plan for its adequacy, acceptability, feasibility, and compliance with joint doctrine. ⁶⁰ Under all of these criteria, the concept of using WMD Civil Support Teams as first military responders is sound. WMD Civil Support Teams are feasible, as first military responders, as support to FEMA, and in support of the FBI, and in support of other states. WMD Civil Support Teams are adequate, in funding, in mission, in forces, in training, in leadership, in support roles, and in equipment. WMD Civil Support Teams are acceptable, politically to federal, state and local authorities, to the first responder community, and especially to the American public. Lastly, the WMD Civil Support Teams are in compliance with Joint Task Force-Civil Support doctrine. The management and coordination of all of the other issues raised, and more, will provide the bedrock of the total solution.

The Depart of Defense position is clear on the WMD Civil Support Team mission. DoD sees the WMD Civil Support Team as a critical component in the total defense against weapons of mass destruction. The DoD reviewed the total Federal Response Plan, assessed the military capability in this area, and found significant gaps in the response. WMD Civil Support Teams were the exact answer to filling those shortfalls. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre "I haven't talked to a major leader in Congress who hasn't at some time in that conversation said that the only thing that makes sense is to have the Guard do this mission." Additionally, the Guard's traditional role as a wartime force makes it especially suited to respond in this environment; the Guard is the tip of the military spear in WMD response.

Related to this is the concern of the FBI and the FEMA, as well as individual States, that WMD Civil Support Teams do not have a valid role, and that the Guard will be deployed in civil support at any rate. The WMD Civil Support Team is not designed to replace any current civilian disaster response, but will support them. Local and State officials do currently have access to a variety of Federal assets, including military assistance, but nowhere do you find the capabilities and reach back that the WMD Civil Support Team will bring to the crisis. Some states note, positively, that there is a significant difference between a serious HAZMAT incident, and an incident featuring a WMD. Civilian responders are not prepared to enter conditions of war, and that is precisely what a WMD incident is. Certainly, the National Guard will be involved with support to civil authorities, but it is the Department of Defense position that if citizen soldiers are to be put in harms way, they must be trained and prepared for the specific event. Lastly, there is evident concern about the ability of the WMD Civil Support Team to actually perform the mission assigned to it. However, like all military units, training, exercises, leadership, and quality people will make

the organization work. Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore is on record as wanting a full WMD Civil Support Team as soon as possible. "Other military vehicles are available, but I personally feel, as the governor of a great military state, that the Guard has a role in this area. We have to eliminate that advantage (terrorism) to the greatest extent that we can through excellence in law enforcement and through excellence and cooperation with our military and Guard."

COMMAND AND CONTROL

What exactly are the issues concerning coordination and management of the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, and how are they to be effectively employed? One of the most serious of this set is the matter of command and control of the Guard teams. Confusion is evident in analyzing the deployment and control of National Guard assets depending on which set of organizational schemes is used.

FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN

The Federal Response Plan, with authority from the Stafford Act, follows a well-defined cycle of providing services and assets in the guise of the Federal Coordination Officer. When state authorities request federal help, the lead agency for providing that help, according to the FRP, is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Understand, however, that FEMA is the lead agency only in consequence management issues - "those services and activities essential to mitigating damage, loss, hardship, or suffering resulting from disasters or catastrophes." Certainly an incident involving a WMD would not only require consequence management, but would also involve responsibilities of the FBI, crisis management - "measures to resolve a hostile situation and to investigate a criminal case for prosecution under federal law." In a severe WMD incident, consequence management would resemble a war like environment, and would involve events that would overwhelm the capabilities of local civilian responders, no matter how well trained. HAZMAT training does nothing for preparing for acts of war. Yet throughout, this FRP view does not address or involve the use of the state National Guard as an immediate tool first military responder. Authorities versed in the Federal Response Plan would not know how to utilize the National Guard WMD Civil Support Team.

Presidential Decision Directive 39 clearly divided the incident threat into two categories, crisis management and consequence management. The two are often coincidental and occur in a tiered effect, and the National Guard will be on the scene long before FEMA or the FBI. Confusion about response could be critical "In a serious WMD incident, time saved is priceless and is measured in human lives saved." And confusion about response is not to be tolerated; "Dr Hamre (Deputy Secretary of Defense) detailed principles that help define the military's proper role in homeland defense. Primary, DoD will not tolerate a situation that permits ambiguity over who has authority to do what, when, and with whom." 66

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The view from the federal military side is also defined, yet incomplete. The Federal lead element is to be the Chemical Biological-Rapid Response Team (CB-RRT). It "is established to assume the mission of coordinating and managing the DoD technical capabilities necessary to respond to a CB terrorist incident."67 Its mission, assigned by the Director of Military Support (DOMS), as stated previously, deploys the unit OPCON to the supported commanders, or the Response Task Force. The newly formed Joint Task Force - Civil Support has the mission of providing for WMD civil support. There are configured two response task forces (RTFs) under the new Joint Forces Command, one east and one west of the Mississippi River. No clear guidelines are in place to determine if JTF-CS or one of the RTFs would have control of the response elements. Further, the JTF-CS is commanded by a reserve component Major General, yet it is also unclear how his relationships to all other elements of the FRP are drawn. Once assigned, the CB-RRT is to carry out the roles assigned by the commander in four areas; (1) command, control, communications, and computers, (2) coordinate DoD crisis response capabilities, (3) coordinate DoD consequence management capabilities, and (4) coordinate DoD emergency technical response capabilities. 68 All of these roles require that the CB-RRT be task organized, tailored, and then deployed or augmented with additional response units from the joint services. This team will be on the ground operating for a supported commander while falling under U.S. Army Forces Command and in coordination with the Federal Coordinating Officer and the Defense Coordinating Officer. Again, the ordering of missions, command and control, coordination, and force structure are all time consuming, poorly defined, and unable to do the role of the National Guard forces already available.

STATE PLAN

The view from the bottom up is refreshingly clearer and simpler. The integrated response concept is effective, and all of the components appear the same, yet when approached from the view of the first responders, the process is more effective. If a local emergency occurs, even an obvious weapon of mass destruction, the first response will be local, and an incident commander (the fire or police chief with the major responsibility) will take charge. If local or regionally cooperating assets are not sufficient for the crisis, the incident commander or mayor will request state assets through the governor and state office of emergency management. "The state's substantial resources, including the National Guard in state status (Title 32), are coordinated through the state's response plan and are normally coordinated by the state's Office of Emergency Services. If state assets are not sufficient to meet the emergency response requirements, they request federal assets through the FEMA Regional Operations Center." The National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams are a state asset responsive to the Adjutant General, and will thus be on scene with all of their equipment while (and if) the Federal Response Plan is still being put into place. 46 % of the U.S. state Office of Emergency Services directors are Adjutant Generals. Once deployed as a state asset, they effect coordination with all other National Guard forces available (aviation, medical, chemical, MP) through the State's POMSO. If ordered to Federal Duty, the WMD Civil Support

Team then falls under the operational control of the supported commander and the Joint Task Force – Civil Support. However, the WMD Civil Support Team will have been on site and functioning in the critical first hours of a crisis. Hence their value. Command and control of the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams will always stay with the State Adjutant General, even if deployed in a Title 32 status to a neighboring state in the FEMA district.

FEMA REGION

Each Federal Emergency Management Agency region is augmented with a number of Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air National Guard units which will provide consequence management assets; and which were factored in to the WMD Civil Support Team state decision process. These factors include Military Airlift, WMD Training/Response Centers, Chemical Companies, Medical Patient Decontamination Teams, Technical Escort Units, and Chemical, Biological Incident Response Forces. The WMD Civil Support Team has a 300-mile diameter rapid response area, and is focused on major metropolitan areas, but could travel much further for an incident. The WMD Civil Support Team will stay in a Title 32 status, and remain under the control of the State Adjutant General. However, if the team is deployed out of state within the FEMA region, interstate compacts must have been in place to give the team authority to operate in another state, without being federalized. Once federalized by presidential order, the teams will function in a Title 10 Federal status, and must operate under different approved laws and rules of engagement.

TRAINING

Like all military units, training and exercises are the key to readiness and ultimate mission success. The training concept to be used for the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, as directed by the Director of Military Support (DOMS), shall make maximum use of existing training sources (emphasis on interagency, military, and distance education) and civilian certification. Training shall progress logically from individual performance based skills to unit training, battle drills, and exercises. The exercise format will be in the fashion of simulations, regional training exercises, and modeling, and must involve all elements of the Federal Response Plan to insure evaluation proficiency. Congressional funding has been provided, WMD Civil Support Team training is currently on target, and external evaluation is scheduled for late spring of 2000.

Additional leader development concepts will be required to skillfully incorporate the WMD Civil Support Team concept into total operations. TRADOC policy, doctrine, and leader training should include courses and sustainment at the Command and General Staff Officer Course, as well as course work on civil support at the Combined Arms Center and the U.S. Army War College. Curriculum should be developed and integrated into the Army's chemical, military police, medical, and engineer schools, and should incorporate advanced distance learning techniques. There should also exist a robust WMD Civil Support Team pre-command course at national and state levels⁷¹.

The National Guard Bureau Report to Congress of July 1999 outlined an implementation timeline, which grouped support roles and functions into "implementation packages." These packages form a guide to notional stages of implementing the WMD Civil Support Team concept. Included is the defining of roles and requirements, writing of doctrine and policy, equipping, and validating readiness. All of this on a timeline based on immediate, near-term, mid-term, and long-term/sustainment roles reaching from training proficiency in January 2000 to FY 04. Also included in the training aspect of WMD Civil Support Team success is the establishment of 22 reconnaissance teams, 65 decontamination teams, and the additional training of 100 medical personnel authorized by Congress. All of this contamination teams, and the

FIRST RESPONDERS

Early resistance to assigning a major role to the National Guard in WMD defense came from the civilian community most related to consequence management. As reported by the General Accounting Office study done in 1999, both the FBI and FEMA were concerned about how the WMD Civil Support Teams would fit into the existing federal plans, and if in fact there would not be simply a duplication of efforts to those already available. Additionally, the local responders, usually HAZMAT emergency teams, would be confused by a new element available, would find nothing new on the scene that was not already in existence, and would already have the capability to reach back to a variety of federal assets available. 74 These points, while valid, were all addressed by the Department of Defense and have continued to constitute a planning point for the employment of WMD Civil Support Teams. One major problem that requires constant maintenance is that as long as confusion exists within the Federal interagency community, the civilian community will be suspicious of the utility of the new WMD Civil Support Teams. Thus the previously discussed command and control issues weigh heavily in building confidence in the first responder community. Under the Federal response plan, the Department of Defense will be tasked to provide some level of support (although not lead) under every one of the twelve emergency support functions. The lead agencies will often not have the full capability to respond to a WMD incident. Local responders may be excellently prepared to deal with HAZMAT toxins, but they will usually have no knowledge of weaponized chemicals or agents. Will we be content to allow the Environmental Protection Agency or the American Red Cross to enter a battleground? The DoD has been given this critical mission, and the WMD Civil Support Team concept is its solution to assisting first responders.

Again, WMD Civil Support Teams are not designed to replace the efforts of the local fire or police, but rather to rapidly assist and support them. Under no circumstances will the WMD Civil Support Team personnel take a lead role where the local incident commander, FBI, FEMA or Federal Coordinating Officer is in charge. The WMD Civil Support Team mission is to deploy, assess, facilitate, and "advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions." As WMD Civil Support Team training and proficiency grows, contact with civilian first responders grows, and the result has been impressive and positive.

The National Guard Bureau Report to Congress was exhaustive in its inclusion of civilian stakeholders in the analysis process. From their study were identified eleven critical needs areas representing shortfalls or gaps in service. These needs were of the pre-event, event management, and post event types. The critical areas are:

Inadequate threat information and dissemination, inadequate and inconsistent WMD training, insufficient WMD response equipment, inadequate WMD planning, inadequate reconnaissance and sampling tools, inadequate C/B response capabilities, inadequate WMD response operations capabilities, lack of medical preparedness and awareness, inadequate communications interoperability, limited mass decontamination facilities, and inadequate quarantine plans. ⁷⁷

From that study evolved 47 National Guard roles which support the critical needs areas and from which were produced the implementation packages. The civilian responder community does not feel themselves prepared to respond to a major WMD incident, and they are continuing to embrace the Guard role in that arena. State and local authorities interviewed in the National Guard Bureau study "believe that the consequences from a WMD event would rapidly overwhelm their capabilities. Overall, the emergency response community lacks the equipment and trained personnel resources required to respond and mitigate a WMD incident in a timely, efficient, and effective manner." Coordination, cooperation, communication, and trust built with the local authorities are an ongoing process. Colonel David Annen, commandant for the Fort Leonard Wood training program for Guard WMD Civil Support Teams stated "Public acceptance will be the key to the new Guard detachment's long-term success. They have to market themselves and their capabilities within their areas so the local incident commanders who would take charge of an emergency situation know these teams are out there." "79

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS PLAN (CONPLAN)

Another critical step in the path to success of the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams is the development of an interagency CONPLAN to guide the use and deployment of the teams. A plan more comprehensive than the CB-RRT CONOPS is needed to address all aspects of the total WMD response picture. It would involve a systematic, tiered, disaster emergency response which would "describe how the FBI crisis response structure, the Federal Response Plan, the federal consequence management mechanisms, and state and local Incident Command Systems will coordinate their activities" ⁸⁰ to include the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams which is only one part of the total DoD response.

Either the staff of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support component of U.S. Joint Forces Command or the Director of Military Support should produce the CONPLAN. Like all plans it must include intent and mission, and should incorporate the 11 critical needs areas and the 47 National Guard mission roles. The plan should address command and control (absolutely critical, and to include CINC, FBI, FEMA, and coordination and liaison elements), task organization and supporting/supported units (Army, Air Force, Navy or Marine), funding, and all operational aspects such as SOPs and service support. Also needed would be an overview of doctrine and manuals and levels of provided support (to include pre-positioning

for major events). Issues such as the development of interstate compacts and delineation of Title 32/Title 10 status concerns must be spelled out, as well as rules of engagement. Also to be planned for would be "not only the direct effects of a WMD attack, but such diverse tasks as controlling refugee flows, feeding and housing vast numbers of displaced persons, and if necessary, conducting of mass burials" Further important issues currently unresolved involve media relations, quarantine, civil disobedience actions, and care of the "worried well".

OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL ISSUES

Every published article concerning the National Guard role in WMD, or any conversation with a WMD Civil Support Team member brings forth concerns and challenges not already identified in this paper. Most of these are of the tactical or operational art variety, and are best left to be solved by the soldiers and airmen commanding and staffing WMD Civil Support Teams. Some are of note, however, for their impact on the strategic level of the WMD Civil Support Team concept. These not yet resolved tactical issues help to illustrate what further level of work is needed for the WMD Civil Support Teams, and require strategic level input for the total process to be successful.

The tactical issues, which impact on the WMD Civil Support Teams, are similar and related to the strategic issues. They include issues of command and control. Deployment of the detachment to another state in a Title 10 or title 32 status must be resolved. The Governor or Adjutant General must be willing to allow them to deploy, and all interstate compacts must be in place and valid if legal issues arise. Further legal issues concerning in state deployment, or our of state deployment (such as the carrying of firearms) and rules of engagement in both cases must be resolved. Force structure must be appropriate for each deployment, and team members must be able continue to function well in a 24 hour, 7-day a week ready status. Specific relationships of command and control must be known. Pre-deployment coordination must be a part of team training. Also, deployment timelines must be appropriate. The detachment has a mission to be at home station ready to deploy within four hours, but what actual timeline for services is valid, both close in and out of state?

Concerns of training and coordination with first responders and local authorities are also significant tactical issues, both in-state and deployed. Available training must be focused on standards applicable to every state and all training must be available and all exercises appropriate. Critical to all mission success in this volatile climate will be the pre-established relationships with local authorities, and the detachments must have clearly effected coordination and continuous liaison with all major metropolitan areas in their area. Also critical is the sharing of information and appropriate intelligence with local civilian responders concerning terrorism threats.

Detachment concerns needing resolution involve security and force protection. If a terrorism threat is indeed identified and real, precautionary measures should be taken by the MSD-WMD Civil Support Teams in their community posture and availability. Appropriate levels of training for such a high profile unit must be delineated. Immunizations and vaccinations and protective clothing and detection equipment still needed must be made available for the WMD Civil Support Teams. Equipment needed

must be available when they need it. And lastly, no National Guard unit or soldier, no matter how tasked, should ever be allowed to lose their basic warfighting skills or become so narrowly focused that their strategic reserve role becomes secondary.

One thing is certain, the mission is critical and the many unresolved questions and issues need answers. National Guard units do not generally train on missions which support military assistance to civilian authorities, so the WMD Civil Support Teams will be the first line focus.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is still much to be done in preparing American society to deter or survive a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. Much has been done, much is being done, and much is in planning, yet all involved say that the U. S. is far from where it needs to be to protect our country. We hearken back to Secretary Cohen's remark "there is not a moment to lose." The general findings and recommendations of the National Guard Bureau Report to Congress in July 1999 are stunning. All of the previous challenges and issues already visited are re-summarized:

The United States is not prepared for effective response to a major domestic terrorist WMD incident. Across most of the nation, there is an overall lack of capability and resources to respond to WMD attacks, especially those involving biological agents. Currently, many communities and the National Guard are not prepared to respond to a chemical incident that falls outside a normal hazardous materials event. Additionally, the media community is, for the most part, unprepared to evacuate, accept and treat even minimal numbers of victims of either a chemical or biological terrorism incident. The lack of preparation relates to lack of training, equipment, planning, and resourcing, including important interagency/joint exercises.

The logic, direction, and authority to continue are certainly clear from the National Command Authorities and Congress. The Clinton administration has made terrorism defense measures a national priority through the language of the National Security Strategy and the Presidential Decision Directive 39 and 62. The Department of Defense took counter-terrorism tasking into reality with the issuance of the shape, prepare and respond concept of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the strategic ends, ways and means guidance of the National Military Strategy. The DoD Tiger Team report laid out the initial assessments and key actions needed to bring the Nation into compliance with the tasking of Congress and the executive branch. The changes to the Unified Command Plan and the subsequent creation of Joint Task Force-Civil Support, coupled with the National Guard Bureau report to congress of 1999 made clear the resolve of DoD to meet this mission and to meet it with resounding success. But we are not there yet.

Early recommendations of all of the major studies and findings need to be revisited and analyzed in order to stay the present successful course. Both Charles Mercier and Chris Seiple, writing in the August 1997 Parameters journal saw common issues and needs. Seiple identified a need for political and Department of Defense leadership, combined with a broad continuum of response and a strong adherence to combat mentality. His recommendations included a significant investment in WMD detection and training efforts, and a unifying of participants, operational concepts, and forums of

response. Mercier's recommendations were just as appropriate, and called for extensive planning and actions to resolve legal issues, command and control, missions, working relationships and training. He further advocated significant upgrading and changes to medical support, supplies and equipment, and the relocation and expansion of response units. The Presidential budget initiatives for FY 2000 go a long way to addressing several of these unresolved issues. The FY 2000 budget request "includes \$10 billion to defend against terrorism and WMD. Included in this request are the following initiatives: Vaccine Research and Development. Public Health Surveillance. Metropolitan Medical Response Systems.

Civilian Medical Stockpile Support. Additional Security Measures to Diplomatic and Consular Facilities."

The Department of Defense Tiger Team report was issued in January of 1998 and echoed many of the concerns being identified elsewhere at about that time. It highlighted a 1997 report to the President, which found shortfalls in the total Federal Response concept to support state and local responders. Specifically noted were shortfalls in equipment, training, medical, information, planning, transportation, and the inability to deal with large numbers of casualties in a WMD incident. Additionally, this DoD report added specifics concerning the non-prepared cities of the U.S. and the non-availability of federal assets, specifically military Reserve Component needs and limits. The DoD Tiger Team recommended five key actions needed to improve the response capability for a WMD incident. They were to establish a Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office, review and update DoD directives in reference to WMD, coordinate development of legislation in reference to Reserve Component WMD response, modify Defense Planning Guidance and the Unified Command Plan, and coordinate a terrorist response OPLAN. Remarkably, all of these initiatives are either complete or in process.

The final study conclusions, which form the basis for the recommendations needed, are from the National Guard Bureau Report to Congress of July 1999. In this, the final definitive report concerning the use of the National Guard in WMD preparedness, exhaustive study confirmed the following conclusions. "With few exceptions, the United States is not prepared to respond effectively to a domestic chemical or biological WMD attack." However, the report finds that the solution will be to provide the Nation's emergency responders with significant resources, training, and planning; supported by the existing and expanding capabilities of the National Guard and Reserve Components to prepare and respond. A documented litany of National Guard initiatives and actions includes the WMD Civil Support Teams, the RECON/DECON elements, the WMD Civil Support light detachments, and the countless liaison, training, and program efforts required. The National Guard is the logical answer to preparing for WMD response, and it will be successful. The tasks identified "do not constitute a new mission, merely an expansion of the vital role that the National Guard already plays in the response arena." There is no fear of losing the National Guard war-fighting role.

CONCLUSION

The threat of terrorism is real. We in America find ourselves more and more vulnerable to asymmetric attacks, and especially those which would involve many types of weapons of mass

destruction. Our national and military policy clearly spells out our priorities and focus for defending our society against attack. Priorities for preparedness and response are drawn, and objectives and resources are being focused against any threat. There are still unresolved issues, but the role of the National Guard and other Reserve Component military forces to support the civilian responders in the wake of a WMD incident is clear. The National Guard has been traditionally the forward-deployed response for American domestic emergencies, and with the additional emphasis spelled out here it will be the obvious answer to our challenges. To again cite Secretary of Defense William Cohen, there are five core principles guiding our preparedness for a terrorist event. They are that military assistance will be in support of civilian responders, that there will be an unambiguous chain of responsibility, that military assistance will not come at the expense of warfighting, that we will preserve American liberties, and that the National Guard and Reserve will constitute out primary response. ⁹² "Preparation is itself a deterrent."

WORD COUNT = 10723.

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 - ⁷⁶ National Guard Bureau, 30.
 - ⁷⁷ Ibid., 96.
 - 78 Ibid.
 - ⁷⁹ Haskell, 77.
 - ⁸⁰ National Guard Bureau, 60.
 - ⁸¹ U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command, 11.
 - ⁸² Herbert Temple, "Guarding the Guard and Nation Against WMD," <u>National Guard</u>, April 1999, 30.
 - ⁸³ William S Cohen, "Preparing for A Grave New World," 19.
 - ⁸⁴ National Guard Bureau, 10.
- ⁸⁵ Chris Seiple, "Consequence Management: Domestic response to Weapons of Mass Destruction," Parameters, Autumn 1997, 129.
- ⁸⁶ Charles L. Mercier Jr., "Terrorists, WMD, and the US Army Reserve," <u>Parameters</u>, Autumn 1997, 113.

- ⁸⁷ National Guard Bureau, 49
- ⁸⁸ Department of Defense Tiger Team, 10.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid., 18.
- 90 National Guard Bureau, 139.
- ⁹¹ Ibid., 143.
- ⁹² William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," 19.
- ⁹³ Ibid.

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